Workspace deployment using a secondary trusted device

ABSTRACT

Systems and methods for workspace deployment using a secondary trusted device are described. In some embodiments, a first Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution, cause the first IHS to: establish a first connection with a second IHS, where the second IHS is configured to establish a second connection with a workspace orchestration service, and where the workspace orchestration service is configured to: receive device identification information of the first IHS from the second IHS; and authenticate the device identification information against a database provided by a manufacturer of the first IHS; and in response to a successful authentication, establish a third connection with the workspace orchestration service.

FIELD

This disclosure relates generally to Information Handling Systems(IHSs), and, more specifically, to systems and methods for workspacedeployment using a secondary trusted device.

BACKGROUND

As the value and use of information continue to increase, individualsand businesses seek additional ways to process and store information.One option is an Information Handling System (IHS). An IHS generallyprocesses, compiles, stores, and/or communicates information or data forbusiness, personal, or other purposes. Because technology andinformation handling needs and requirements may vary between differentapplications, IHSs may also vary regarding what information is handled,how the information is handled, how much information is processed,stored, or communicated, and how quickly and efficiently the informationmay be processed, stored, or communicated. The variations in IHSs allowfor IHSs to be general or configured for a specific user or for aspecific use such as financial transaction processing, airlinereservations, enterprise data storage, global communications, etc. Inaddition, IHSs may include a variety of hardware and software componentsthat may be configured to process, store, and communicate informationand may include one or more computer systems, data storage systems, andnetworking systems.

IHSs provide users with capabilities for accessing, creating, andmanipulating data, and often implement a variety of security protocolsin order to protect this data. Historically, IHSs have been designed toimplement security paradigms that isolate them from possible securitythreats, much like a castle is designed and constructed to safeguardpersons within its walls. In the case of a network of IHSs, for example,security systems implement strategies that isolate the entire networkfrom threats. In effect, a set of castle walls is constructed around theentire network. While working from within the walls of such systems,users may be provided with secure and productive use of data.

However, security paradigms that isolate protected data within the wallsof a castle are increasingly frustrated by the realities of moderncomputing. Nowadays, users expect to access protected data using aplethora of different IHSs while located at a variety of physicallocations. In an effort to leverage the security of the system providingaccess to the data, current protocols for supporting remote access havesought to extend the defenses of the system to remote IHSs, essentiallyextending the castle walls to temporarily include all or part of theremote IHSs.

Another complication of modern computing is the user's expectation thatthey will be able utilize their own personal IHSs to access some or allof their protected data, even if those users are provided withenterprise-issued IHSs for accessing it. For administrators of suchsystems, this increases the difficulty in securing all manners in whichprotected data may be accessed. This difficulty is greatly expanded bythe need to support access to protected data using an ever-growing listof software applications, whether on a personal IHS or anenterprise-issued IHS. Moreover, the administration of such systems isfurther complicated by the need to support access to protected data froma variety of physical locations and via a variety of networks, includinguntrusted networks. Faced with such problems, systems for providingaccess to protected data are often burdensome to administer andultimately the data is insufficiently protected so as to facilitate itsproductive use.

A known technique for securing access to protected data accessed via anIHS is to isolate the data within a segregated or virtualizationenvironment that runs on the IHS using a virtual machine or container.Conventional types of virtualization environments provide varyingdegrees of isolation from the hardware and operating system of the IHS.However, similarly to the castle wall defenses of security paradigmsthat seek to isolate protected data within a secure perimeter,conventional virtualization environments are also ill-suited to moderncomputing. Particularly, these virtualization techniques establish anisolated computing environment on an IHS that allows a user to accessonly data and applications approved for that user.

In some instances, conventional virtualization techniques may determinethe data, applications, and protections to be provided by on an IHSbased solely on the identity of the user, and therefore tend toimplement all security protocols that would be necessary to secureaccess to all approved data and applications. As the inventors hereofhave recognized, however, not only does this result in complexvirtualization efforts that consume large portions of the memory andprocessing capabilities of the IHS, but conventional techniques also donot account for what the user actually intends to do while operating theIHS.

As the inventors hereof have further recognized, modern computing oughtto provide users with access to protected data via a variety of IHSs andat practically any location. Yet conventional virtualization fails toaccount for the specific context in which an IHS is being used during aparticular session, much less to account for changes to the context inwhich an IHS is used during a session. Furthermore, conventionalvirtualization techniques tend to provide support for many capabilitiesthat are not actually used. The overhead required to provide suchunnecessary capabilities unduly burdens the operation of an IHS anddegrades productivity and user experience.

SUMMARY

Systems and methods for workspace deployment using a secondary trusteddevice are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, afirst Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor and amemory coupled to the processor, the memory having program instructionsstored thereon that, upon execution, cause the first IHS to: establish afirst connection with a second IHS, where the second IHS is configuredto establish a second connection with a workspace orchestration service,and where the workspace orchestration service is configured to: receivedevice identification information of the first IHS from the second IHS;and authenticate the device identification information against adatabase provided by a manufacturer of the first IHS; and in response toa successful authentication, establish a third connection with theworkspace orchestration service.

In some cases, the second IHS may be managed by the workspaceorchestration service prior to the first connection. The programinstructions upon execution, may cause the first IHS to: receive anorchestration code from the second IHS, wherein the second IHS isconfigured to receive the orchestration code from the workspaceorchestration service and to transmit the orchestration code to thefirst IHS; and transmit the device identification information and theorchestration code encrypted with a first key to the second IHS, whereinthe second IHS is configured to forward the encrypted deviceidentification information and orchestration code to the workspaceorchestration service, and wherein the workspace orchestration serviceis configured to retrieve a second key corresponding to the first keyand decrypt the encrypted device identification information andorchestration code using the second key.

The program instructions, upon execution, may also cause the first IHSto: receive Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)data from the second IHS, wherein the second IHS is configured toreceive the TLS or SSL data from the workspace orchestration service andto transmit the TLS or SSL data to the first IHS; and establish thethird connection using the TLS or SSL data. The database may include asoftware entitlement database.

The program instructions upon execution, may cause the first IHS toreceive a workspace definition from the workspace orchestration servicevia the third connection. Additionally, or alternatively, the programinstructions upon execution, may cause the first IHS to transmit contextinformation to the workspace orchestration service, and wherein theworkspace orchestration service is configured to: (i) calculate asecurity target and a productivity target based upon the contextinformation, and (ii) create the workspace definition based upon thesecurity target and the productivity target.

The security target may be calculated, at least in part, based upon theparticipation of the second IHS in the authentication of the first IHS.Additionally, or alternatively, the security target may be calculated,at least in part, based upon at least one of: a risk metric associatedwith a locale of the first IHS, a risk metric associated with a user ofthe first IHS, a risk metric associated with a network of the clientIHS, a risk metric associated with hardware of the first IHS, a riskmetric associated with a requested datafile, or a regulatory risk metricassociated with the user, the locale, and the requested datafile, andwherein the productivity target is calculated by the workspaceorchestration service based upon at least one of: a resource metricassociated with a locale of the first IHS, a resource metric associatedwith a user of the first IHS, a resource metric associated with anetwork of the first IHS, a resource metric associated with hardware ofthe first IHS, or a resource metric associated with a storage system ofa requested datafile.

The workspace definition may include at least one of: a threatmonitoring level, a threat detection level, a threat analytics level, athreat response level, a storage confidentiality level, a networkconfidentiality level, a memory confidentiality level, a displayconfidentiality level, a user authentication level, an InformationTechnology (IT) administration level, a regulatory compliance level, alocal storage control level, a Central Processing Unit (CPU) accesslevel, a graphics access level, an application usage level, or anapplication installation level. The program instructions, uponexecution, may further cause the IHS to instantiate a workspace basedupon the workspace definition.

In another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a memory storagedevice may have program instructions stored thereon that, upon executionby an IHS of a workspace orchestration service, cause the IHS to:establish a first connection with a first IHS; receive deviceidentification information of a second IHS from the first IHS, whereinthe first IHS is configured to retrieve the device identificationinformation from the second IHS over a second connection; authenticatethe device identification information against a database provided by amanufacturer of the second IHS; and in response to a successfulauthentication, establish a third connection with the second IHS.

In yet another illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, a method mayinclude: establishing, by a first IHS, a first connection with a secondIHS; transmitting, by the first IHS, device identification informationreceived from the second IHS to a workspace orchestration service over asecond connection; in response to a successful authentication of thedevice identification information by the workspace orchestration serviceagainst a database provided by a manufacturer of the second IHS, receiveTLS or SSL from the workspace orchestration service; and transmit, bythe first IHS, the TLS or SSL data to the second IHS, wherein the secondIHS is configured to establish a third connection with the workspaceorchestration service using the TLS or SSL data, and wherein theworkspace orchestration service is configured to transmit a workspacedefinition to the second IHS over the third connection.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention(s) is/are illustrated by way of example and is/arenot limited by the accompanying figures, in which like referencesindicate similar elements. Elements in the figures are illustrated forsimplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting examples of components of an IHSconfigured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for modernizingworkspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIGS. 3A and 3B are a diagram depicting an example of a systemconfigured to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management inan enterprise productivity ecosystem, according to various embodiments.

FIG. 4 is a diagram depicting an example of a method for workspacedeployment using a secondary trusted device, according to variousembodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

For purposes of this disclosure, an IHS may include any instrumentalityor aggregate of instrumentalities operable to compute, calculate,determine, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate,switch, store, display, communicate, manifest, detect, record,reproduce, handle, or utilize any form of information, intelligence, ordata for business, scientific, control, or other purposes. For example,an IHS may be a personal computer (e.g., desktop or laptop), tabletcomputer, mobile device (e.g., Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or smartphone), server (e.g., blade server or rack server), a network storagedevice, or any other suitable device and may vary in size, shape,performance, functionality, and price. An example of an IHS is describedin more detail below. FIG. 1 shows various internal components of an IHSconfigured to implement certain of the described embodiments. It shouldbe appreciated that although certain embodiments described herein may bediscussed in the context of a personal computing device, otherembodiments may utilize various other types of IHSs.

FIG. 1 is a diagram depicting components of an example IHS 100configured for securing a dynamic workspace in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. In some embodiments, IHS 100 may be employed toinstantiate, manage, and/or terminate a workspace, such as a secureenvironment that may provide the user of IHS 100 with access toenterprise data while isolating the enterprise data from the operatingsystem (OS) and other applications executed by IHS 100. In someembodiments, the construction of a workspace for a particular purposeand for use in a particular context may be orchestrated remotely fromthe IHS 100 by a workspace orchestration services, such as describedwith regard to FIG. 1. In some embodiments, portions of the workspaceorchestration may be performed locally on IHS 100. IHS 100 may beconfigured with program instructions that, upon execution, cause IHS 100to perform one or more of the various operations disclosed herein. Insome embodiments, IHS 100 may be an element of a larger enterprisesystem that may include any number of similarly configured IHSs innetwork communications with each other.

As shown in FIG. 1, IHS 100 includes one or more processor(s) 101, suchas a Central Processing Unit (CPU), operable to execute code retrievedfrom system memory 105. Although IHS 100 is illustrated with a singleprocessor, other embodiments may include two or more processors, thatmay each be configured identically, or to provide specialized processingfunctions. Processor(s) 101 may include any processor capable ofexecuting program instructions, such as an INTEL PENTIUM seriesprocessor or any general-purpose or embedded processors implementing anyof a variety of Instruction Set Architectures (ISAs), such as the x86,POWERPC®, ARM®, SPARC®, or MIPS® ISAs, or any other suitable ISA. In theembodiment of FIG. 1, processor(s) 101 includes an integrated memorycontroller 118 that may be implemented directly within the circuitry ofthe processor(s) 101, or memory controller 118 may be a separateintegrated circuit that is located on the same die as processor(s) 101.Memory controller 118 may be configured to manage the transfer of datato and from system memory 105 of IHS 100 via high-speed memory interface104.

System memory 105 that is coupled to processor(s) 101 via memory bus 104provides processor(s) 101 with a high-speed memory that may be used inthe execution of computer program instructions by processor(s) 101.Accordingly, system memory 105 may include memory components, such assuch as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), NAND Flash memory,suitable for supporting high-speed memory operations by processor(s)101. In some embodiments, system memory 105 may combine both persistent,non-volatile memory and volatile memory.

In certain embodiments, system memory 105 includes secure storage 120that may be a portion of the system memory designated for storage ofinformation, such as access policies, component signatures, encryptionkeys, and other cryptographic information, for use in hosting a secureworkspace on IHS 100. In such embodiments, a signature may be calculatedbased on the contents of secure storage 120 and stored as a referencesignature. The integrity of the data stored in secure storage 120 maythen be validated at a later time by recalculating this signature of thecontents of the secure storage and comparing the recalculated signatureagainst the reference signature.

IHS 100 utilizes chipset 103 that may include one or more integratedcircuits that are coupled to processor(s) 101. In the embodiment of FIG.1, processor(s) 101 is depicted as a component of chipset 103. In otherembodiments, all of chipset 103, or portions of chipset 108 may beimplemented directly within the integrated circuitry of processor(s)101. Chipset 103 provides processor(s) 101 with access to a variety ofresources accessible via bus 102. In IHS 100, bus 102 is illustrated asa single element. However, other implementations may utilize any numberof buses to provide the illustrated pathways served by bus 102.

As illustrated, a variety of resources may be coupled to processor(s)101 of IHS 100 through chipset 103. For instance, chipset 103 may becoupled to network interface 109, such as provided by a NetworkInterface Controller (NIC) that is coupled to the IHS 100 and allows theIHS 100 to communicate via a network, such as the Internet or a LAN.Network interface device 109 may provide IHS 100 with wired and/orwireless network connections via a variety of network technologies, suchas wireless cellular or mobile networks (CDMA, TDMA, LTE etc.), WIFI andBLUETOOTH. In certain embodiments, network interface 109 may supportconnections between a trusted IHS component, such as trusted controller115, and a remote orchestration service. In such embodiments, aconnection supported by network interface 109 between the remoteorchestration service and the trusted component may be considered anout-of-band (00B) connection that is isolated from the OS of the IHS.

Chipset 102 may also provide access to one or more display device(s) 108via graphics processor 107. In certain embodiments, graphics processor107 may be comprised within one or more video or graphics cards or anembedded controller installed as components of the IHS 100. Graphicsprocessor 107 may generate display information and provide the generatedinformation to one or more display device(s) 108 coupled to IHS 100,where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS, such as via an I/O port116, where display device(s) 108 may include integrated display devicesand/or external display devices coupled to IHS. In certain embodiments,graphics processor 107 may be integrated within processor 101. The oneor more display devices 108 coupled to IHS 100 may utilize LCD, LED,OLED, or other thin film display technologies. Each display device 108may be capable of touch input such as via a touch controller that may bean embedded component of display device 108, graphics processor 107, ora separate component of IHS 100 accessed via bus 102.

In certain embodiments, chipset 103 may utilize one or more I/Ocontrollers to access hardware components such as user input devices 111and sensors 112. For instance, I/O controller 110 may provide access touser-input devices 110 such as a keyboard, mouse, touchpad, touchscreenand/or other peripheral input devices. User input devices 111 mayinterface with I/O controller 110 through wired or wireless connections.Sensors 112 accessed via I/O controllers 110 may provide access to datadescribing environmental and operating conditions of IHS 100 (e.g.,accelerometers, gyroscopes, hinge sensors, rotation sensors, hall effectsensors, temperature sensors, voltage sensors, current sensors, IRsensors, photosensors, proximity sensors, distance sensors, magneticsensors, microphones, ultrasonic sensors, etc.).

In some cases, chipset 103 may include a sensor hub capable of utilizinginformation collected by sensors 112 in determining the relativeorientation and movement of IHS 100. For instance, the sensor hub mayutilize inertial movement sensors, that may include accelerometer,gyroscope, and magnetometer sensors, and are capable of determining thecurrent orientation and movement of IHS 100 (e.g., IHS 100 is motionlesson a relatively flat surface, IHS 100 is being moved irregularly and islikely in transport, the hinge of IHS 100 is oriented in a verticaldirection). In certain embodiments, the sensor hub may also includecapabilities for determining a location and movement of IHS 100 based ontriangulation of network signal and based on network informationprovided by the OS or network interface 109. In some embodiments, thesensor hub may support additional sensors, such as optical, infrared andsonar sensors, that may provide support for xR (virtual, augmented,and/or mixed reality) sessions hosted by the IHS 100 and may be used bythe sensor hub provide an indication of a user's presence near IHS 100,such as whether a user is present, absent, and/or facing the integrateddisplay 108.

In cases where the end-user is present before IHS 100, the sensor hubmay further determine a distance of the end-user from the IHS, wherethis determination may be made continuously, at periodic intervals, orupon request. The detected or calculated distances may be used byprocessor 101 to classify the user as being in the IHS's near-field(user's position<threshold distance A), mid-field (threshold distanceA<user's position<threshold distance B, where B>A), or far-field (user'sposition>threshold distance C, where C>B). As described in additionaldetail below, the failure to detect an authenticated user of the IHS 100within a proximity of the IHS 100 may result in a change in the securityprofile of IHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security riskof workspaces operating on IHS 100. Similar re-evaluation may betriggered based on the detection of additional individuals in proximityto IHS 100.

In embodiments where IHS 100 may support multiple physicalconfigurations, such as a convertible laptop, N-in-1 device, or thelike, the sensor hub may utilize one or more mode sensors 112 thatcollect readings that may be used in determining the current posture inwhich the IHS 100 is physically configured. In certain embodiments, suchposture determinations may be additionally made using the movement andorientation information provided by sensors 112. In laptop andconvertible laptop embodiments, for example, processor 101 or trustedcontroller 115 may utilize a lid position sensor 112 to determine therelative angle between the two panels of the laptop in order todetermine the mode in which IHS 100 is physically configured. In suchembodiments, the lid position sensor may measure the angle of rotationof the hinge that connects the base panel and lid panel of IHS 100. Insome embodiments, processor 101 or trusted controller 115 may providecollected lid position information, such as the hinge angle, to thesensor hub for use in determining the posture in which IHS 100 isconfigured. In some embodiments, the sensor hub may interface directlywith the lid position sensor in determining hinge angle information.

The sensor hub may determine the posture of IHS 100 based, at least inpart, on the angle of rotation of the hinge of IHS 100 from a closedposition. A first range of hinge angles from a closed position mayindicate a laptop posture, a second range of hinge angles may indicate alandscape posture and a third range of angles may indicate a tabletposture. The sensor hub may additionally utilize orientation andmovement information collected from inertial movement sensors 112 tofurther determine the posture in which the IHS 100 is physicallyconfigured. For instance, if the sensor hub determines that IHS 100 isconfigured with a hinge angle of a laptop configuration, but IHS 100 isoriented on its side, the IHS may be determined to be in a book mode. IfIHS 100 is determined to be tilted such that the hinge is orientedbetween horizontal and vertical, the user's face is detected to befacing the integrated display, and IHS 100 is experiencing slightmovement, the sensor hub may determine that the IHS 100 is being used ina book posture. The sensor hub may determine that IHS 100 is opened to a180-degree hinge angle and lies on a flat surface, thus indicating thatIHS 100 it is being used in a landscape posture. The sensor hub maysimilarly determine that IHS 100 is in a tent configuration, in responseto detecting a hinge angle within a defined range, such as between 300and 345 degrees, and also detecting an orientation of IHS 100 where thehinge is aligned horizontally and is higher than both of the displaypanels of IHS 100.

Other components of IHS 100 may include one or more I/O ports 116 forcommunicating with peripheral external devices as well as various inputand output devices. For instance, I/O 116 ports may include HDMI(High-Definition Multimedia Interface) ports for use in connectingexternal display devices to IHS 100 and USB (Universal Serial Bus)ports, by which a variety of external devices may be coupled to IHS 100.In some embodiments, external devices coupled to IHS 100 via an I/O port116 may include storage devices that support transfer of data to andfrom system memory 105 and/or storage devices 119 of IHS 100. Asdescribed in additional detail below, the coupling of storage devicesvia an I/O port 116 may result in a change in the security profile ofIHS 100, thus triggering a re-evaluation of the security risk ofworkspaces operating on IHS 100.

Chipset 103 also provides processor(s) 101 with access to one or morestorage devices 119. In various embodiments, storage device 119 may beintegral to the IHS 100, or may be external to the IHS 100. In certainembodiments, storage device 119 may be accessed via a storage controllerthat may be an integrated component of the storage device. Storagedevice 119 may be implemented using any memory technology allowing IHS100 to store and retrieve data. For instance, storage device 119 may bea magnetic hard disk storage drive or a solid-state storage drive. Insome embodiments, storage device 119 may be a system of storage devices,such as a cloud drive accessible via network interface 109.

As illustrated, IHS 100 also includes BIOS (Basic Input/Output System)117 that may be stored in a non-volatile memory accessible by chipset103 via bus 102. Upon powering or restarting IHS 100, processor(s) 101may utilize BIOS 117 instructions to initialize and test hardwarecomponents coupled to IHS 100. BIOS 117 instructions may also load an OSfor use by IHS 100. BIOS 117 provides an abstraction layer that allowsthe OS to interface with the hardware components of the IHS 100. TheUnified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) was designed as a successorto BIOS. As a result, many modern IHSs utilize UEFI in addition to orinstead of a BIOS. As used herein, BIOS is intended to also encompassUEFI.

In the illustrated embodiment, BIOS 117 includes a predefined memory ormemory region that may be referred to as NVM (Non-Volatile Memory)mailbox 106. In such an implementation, mailbox 106 may provide asecured storage location for use in storing workspace access policies,signatures, cryptographic keys or other data utilized to host andvalidate a workspace on IHS 100. In certain embodiments, the BIOSmailbox 106 may be utilized as a secure storage utilized by a remoteorchestration service in order to store access policies andcryptographic keys for use in delivering and deploying a securedcontainer on IHS 100. BIOS mailbox 106 and secured storage 120 in systemmemory 105 may be utilized in this manner instead of, or in conjunctionwith, out-of-band functions implemented by trusted controller 115.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 is coupled to IHS 100.For example, trusted controller 115 may be an embedded controller (EC)that is installed as a component of the motherboard of IHS 100. Invarious embodiments, trusted controller 115 may perform variousoperations in support of the delivery and deployment of a workspace toIHS 100. In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may interoperatewith a remote orchestration service via an out-of-band communicationspathway that is isolated from the OS that runs on IHS 100. Networkinterface 109 may support such out-of-band communications betweentrusted controller 115 and a remote orchestration service.

Trusted controller 115 may receive cryptographic information requiredfor secure delivery and deployment of a workspace to IHS 100. In suchembodiments, the cryptographic information may be stored to securedstorage 121 maintained by trusted controller 115. Additionally, oralternatively, trusted controller 115 may support execution of a trustedoperating environment that may support cryptographic operations used todeploy a workspace on IHS 100. Additionally, or alternatively, trustedcontroller 115 may support deployment of a workspace within the OS ofIHS 100 via an out-of-band communications channel that is isolated fromthe OS and allows the workspace to communicate with a trusted agentprocess of the OS.

Trusted controller 115 may also provide support for certaincryptographic processing used to support secure deployment and operationof workspaces on IHS 100. In some embodiments, such cryptographicprocessing may be provided via operations of a secure operatingenvironment hosted by trusted controller 115 in isolation from thesoftware and other hardware components of the IHS 100. In someembodiments, trusted controller 115 may rely on cryptographic processingprovided by dedicated cryptographic hardware supported by the IHS, suchas a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) microcontroller. In some embodiments,the secured storage 121 of trusted controller 115 may be utilized tostore cryptographic information for use in authorization of workspaces.

In certain embodiments, trusted controller 115 may be additionallyconfigured to calculate signatures that uniquely identify individualcomponents of IHS 100. In such scenarios, trusted controller 115 maycalculate a hash value based on the configuration of a hardware and/orsoftware component coupled to IHS 100. For instance, trusted controller115 may calculate a hash value based on all firmware and other code orsettings stored in an onboard memory of a hardware component, such as anetwork interface 109. Such hash values may be calculated as part of atrusted process of manufacturing IHS 100 and may be maintained in thesecure storage 121 as a reference signature.

Trusted controller 115 may be further configured to recalculate a hashvalue at a later time for such a component. The hash value recalculatedfor the component may then be compared against the reference hash valuesignature in order to determine if any modifications have been made to acomponent, thus indicating the component has been compromised. In thismanner, trusted controller 115 may be used to validate the integrity ofhardware and software components installed on IHS 100. In certainembodiments, remote orchestration service 206 may verify the integrityof the trusted controller 115 in the same manner, by calculating asignature of trusted controller 115 and comparing it to a referencesignature calculated during a trusted process for manufacture of IHS100. In various embodiments, one or more of these operations supportedby trusted controller 115 may be implemented using BIOS 117.

Trusted controller 115 may also implement operations for interfacingwith a power adapter in managing power for IHS 100. Such operations maybe utilized to determine the power status of IHS 100, such as whetherIHS 100 is operating from battery power or is plugged into an AC powersource. Firmware instructions utilized by trusted controller 115 may beused to operate a secure execution environment that may includeoperations for providing various core functions of IHS 100, such aspower management and management of certain operating modes of IHS 100(e.g., turbo modes, maximum operating clock frequencies of certaincomponents, etc.).

In managing operating modes of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayimplement operations for detecting certain changes to the physicalconfiguration of IHS 100 and managing the modes corresponding todifferent physical configurations of IHS 100. For instance, where IHS100 is a laptop computer or a convertible laptop computer, trustedcontroller 115 may receive inputs from a lid position sensor 112 thatmay detect whether the two sides of the laptop have been latchedtogether to a closed position. In response to lid position sensor 112detecting latching of the lid of IHS 100, trusted controller 115 mayinitiate operations for shutting down IHS 100 or placing IHS 100 in alow-power mode.

IHS 100 may support the use of various power modes. In some embodiments,the power modes of IHS 100 may be implemented through operations oftrusted controller 115 and/or the OS of IHS 100. In various embodiments,IHS 100 may support various reduced power modes in order to reduce powerconsumption and/or conserve battery power when IHS 100 is not activelyin use, and/or to control a level of performance available to the userby increasing or decreasing a maximum operating clock frequency of acomponent of IHS 100 (e.g., processor(s) 101).

In some embodiments, an IHS 100 may not include all of the componentsshown in FIG. 1. In other embodiments, an IHS 100 may include othercomponents in addition to those that are shown in FIG. 1. Furthermore,some components that are represented as separate components in FIG. 1may instead be integrated with other components. For example, in certainembodiments, all or a portion of the operations executed by theillustrated components may instead be provided by components integratedinto processor(s) 101 as systems-on-a-chip.

FIG. 2 is a diagram depicting an example of method 200 for securing adynamic workspace in an enterprise productivity ecosystem. For sake ofillustration, method 200 has been split into three phases: workspaceinitialization phase 200A, workspace orchestration phase 200B, andworkspace termination phase 200C. During initialization 200A, user 201(e.g., an enterprise user) operates an IHS 100 (e.g., a desktop, alaptop, a tablet, a smart phone, etc.) such as described with regard toFIG. 1 within physical environment 202 (e.g., any type of environmentand its associated context, including physical location, geographiclocation, location within a particular facility or building, detectednetworks, time of day, proximity of the user, individuals in thevicinity of IHS 100, etc.).

Method 200 starts with an action by user 201 at a launch point 203 thatmay be, for example, a corporate launch point provided by an employer ofuser 201, a launch point 203 provided by the manufacturer of IHS 100, ora launch point provided as a service to user 201 by a third-party.Particularly, user 201 operates IHS 100 to access launch point 203 thatis provided, for example, in the form of a web portal, a portalapplication running in the OS of IHS 100, a special-purpose portalworkspace operating on IHS 100, or the like. In various implementations,launch point 203 may include Graphical User Interface (GUI) elementsrepresenting different software applications, data sources and/or otherresources that the user may desire to execute and/or manipulate. Invarious embodiments, launch point may provide a graphical, textualand/or audio interface by which data or other resource may be requestedby a user 201. As such, an authenticated user 201 may be provided alaunch point that provides visibility as to one or more softwareapplications and an aggregation of user's data sources available acrossall of their datastores (e.g., local storage, cloud storage, etc.).

As described in additional detail below, workspaces for providing user201 with access to requested data or other resources may operate using alocal management agent 332 that operates on IHS 100 and is configured tointeroperate with workspace orchestration service 206. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be provided in the form of a portal(e.g., a webpage, OS application or special purpose workspace) thatallows user 201 to request access to managed resources. In variousembodiments, launch point 203 may be hosted by remote workspaceorchestration service 206, local management agent 332 on IHS 100, or anysuitable combination thereof. Examples of launch point 203 technologiesmay include WORKSPACE ONE INTELLIGENT HUB from WMWARE, INC., and DELLHYBRID CLIENT from DELL TECHNOLOGIES INC., among others.

Initialization phase 200A begins when user 201 chooses to launch anapplication or access a data source managed by the workspaceorchestration service 206. In response to an access request issued byuser 201 (e.g., the user “clicks” on an icon of launch point 203), localmanagement agent 332 of IHS 100 collects initial security andproductivity context information at 204. For example, security contextinformation may include attributes indicating a security risk associatedwith: the data and/or application being requested, a level of riskpresented by the user 201, the hardware utilized by the IHS 100, thelogical environment of IHS 100 in which a workspace will be deployed toprovide access to the requested data and/or application, and thephysical environment 202 in which IHS 100 is currently located.

Accordingly, in this disclosure, the term “security context” generallyrefers to data or other information related to a security posture inwhich a workspace will be deployed and utilized, where the securityposture may be based on the, user, IHS 100, data to be accessed via theworkspace, and/or environment 202. As described in additional detailwith regard to FIGS. 4 and 5, a security context may be quantified as asecurity risk score in support of evaluations of the level or riskassociated with providing user 201 access to requested data and/orapplication while using IHS 100 in the particular context. A “securityrisk score” generally refers to a numerical value usable to score,quantify, or measure various security characteristics of the securitycontext associated with a request. A risk score may be an aggregatescore associated with the overall security risk context, whereas a “riskmetric” may be a measurement of risk for a sub-category of some part ofthe security context.

For example, security metrics that may be used in the calculation of asecurity risk score for a particular security context may include, butare not limited to: a classification of the requested data source and/orapplication, authentication factors used to identify user 201, thelocation of IHS 100, a role or other group classifications associatedwith user 201, validation of networks in use by IHS 100, type of networkin use by IHS 100, network firewall configurations in use by IHS 100,indicators of attack (IoA), indicators of compromise (IoC) regarding IHS100 or a resource being requested by user 201, patch levels associatedwith the OS and other applications in use on IHS 100, availability ofencryption, type of available encryption, access to secured storage, useof attestable hardware by IHS 100, supported degree of workspaceisolation by IHS 100, etc.

The term “productivity context” generally refers to user productivityassociated with a workspace, user, IHS, or environment. A “productivityscore” generally refers to an index usable to score, quantify, ormeasure various productivity characteristics of a productivity context.Examples of productivity context information include, but are notlimited to: the hardware of the IHS, the software of the IHS, includingthe OS, power states and maximum clock frequencies of selectedcomponents of the IHS, peripheral devices coupled to the IHS, eitherpermanently or temporarily, networks available to the IHS and theperformance characteristics of those networks, software installersavailable on the IHS, etc.

Initial productivity and security targets for a workspace may becalculated based on the context of user's 201 actions combined with theproductivity and security context in which the workspace will operate.The productivity and security targets may also be based on user's 201behavioral analytics, IHS 100 telemetry and/or environmental information(e.g., collected via sensors 112). In some cases, at 205, a localmanagement agent operating on IHS 100 may calculate initial security andproductivity targets based upon the collected security and productivitycontext. In other cases, remote workspace orchestration service 206 maycalculate security and productivity targets.

As used herein, the term “security target” generally refers to theattack surface presented by a workspace that is created and operatedbased on a workspace definition, while the term “productivity target”generally refers to the productivity characteristics of a particularworkspace definition. Examples of a productivity target include, but arenot limited to: type of data or data source available to user 201,minimum latency of a workspace, etc. Conversely, attributes that may beused to characterize a security target may include, but are not limitedto: a minimum security score for a workspace, a minimum trust score ofIHS 100, authentication requirements for user 201 (e.g., how manyauthentication factors are required, frequency of re-authentication),minimum level of trust in the network utilized by a workspace, requiredisolation of a workspace from IHS 100, the ability to access browserwithin a workspace, the ability to transfer data between workspaces, theability to extend a workspace, etc.

Moreover, the term “workspace definition” generally refers to acollection of attributes that describe aspects a workspace that may beassembled, created, and deployed in a manner that satisfies a securitytarget (i.e., the definition presents an attack surface that presents anacceptable level of risk) and a productivity target (e.g., data access,access requirements, upper limits on latency, etc.) in light of thesecurity context (e.g., location, patch level, threat information,network connectivity, etc.) and the productivity context (e.g.,available device type and performance, network speed, etc.) in which theworkspace is to be deployed. A workspace definition may enable fluidityof migration of an instantiated workspace, since the definition supportsthe ability for a workspace to be assembled on any target OS or IHS thatis configured for operation with the workspace orchestration service206.

In describing capabilities and constraints of a workspace, a workspacedefinition 208 may prescribe one or more of: authentication requirementsfor user 201, containment and/or isolation of the workspace (e.g., localapplication, sandbox, docker container, progressive web application or“PWA,” Virtual Desktop Infrastructure “VDI,” etc.), primary applicationsthat can be executed in the defined containment of the workspace toenable user 201 to be productive with one or more data sources,additional applications that enhance productivity, security componentsthat reduce the scope of the security target presented by theproductivity environment (DELL DATA GUARDIAN from DELL TECHNOLOGIESINC., an anti-virus, etc.), the data sources to be accessed andrequirements for routing that data to and from the workspace containment(e.g., use of VPN, minimum encryption strength), workspace capabilitiesto independently attach other resources; etc.

In some implementations, workspace definitions may be based at least inpart on static policies or rules defined, for example, by anenterprise's Information Technology (IT) personnel. In someimplementations, static rules may be combined and improved upon bymachine learning (ML) and/or artificial intelligence (AI) algorithmsthat evaluate historical productivity and security data collected asworkspaces are life cycled. In this manner, rules may be dynamicallymodified over time to generate improved workspace definitions. If it isdetermined, for instance, that a user dynamically adds a text editorevery time he uses MICROSOFT VISUAL STUDIO from MICROSOFT CORPORATION,then workspace orchestration service 206 may autonomously add thatapplication to the default workspace definition for that user.

Still with respect to FIG. 2, during orchestration 200B, the initialsecurity and productivity targets are processed and/or reconciledagainst resources, device capabilities, and cloud services available,etc., to produce a workspace definition at 208. As described, aworkspace definition may specify capabilities and constraints of aworkspace, such as: runtime security requirements of the workspacecontainment (e.g., such as isolation from the OS of IHS 100 or fromcertain hardware of IHS 100), the use of reference measurements toattest to the integrity of the workspace once running, applications tobe provided for operation within the workspace, aggregation of resourcesavailable via the workspace, access configurations (e.g., virtualprivate network or “VPN”), etc.

The initial workspace definition may then be utilized by automationengine 302 of workspace orchestration service 206 to coordinate theassembly 209 and instantiation 210 of a workspace on an appropriateplatform—e.g., on the cloud or on IHS 201—based on the security andproductivity contexts in which the workspace will operate. In caseswhere a workspace is cloud-hosted, the automation engine 302 mayassemble and instantiate a remote workspace that may be accessed via asecure connection established via a web browser or other web-basedcomponent operating on the IHS 100. In some embodiments, automationengine 302 may resolve configuration conflicts between a workspacedefinition and the user's inputs in the operation of a workspace.

The instantiated workspace is operated by user 201 at 211, and newproductivity and security context information related to the behavior oruse of data is generated at 212. This operation of a workspace mayresult in a change or new classification of data based upon what user201 has done, accessed, and/or created, thus resulting in a change tothe security context of the workspace. To the extent the user'sbehavioral analytics, device telemetry, and/or the environment haschanged to a quantifiable degree, these changes in security context mayserve as additional input for a reevaluation of the security andperformance targets at 207 by automation engine 302. Additionally, oralternatively, new workspace context, security target, and/orproductivity target may be now measured against the initial targets, andthe result may cause automation engine 302 to produce a new workspacedefinition at 208, if appropriate.

Particularly, if the instantiated workspace(s) have parameters that falloutside of the range of the target indexes such that a differencebetween additional or updated context information and the initial orprevious context information is scored below a threshold value,automation engine 302 may process the assembly of modifications to anexisting workspace and deploy such modifications at 210. Conversely, ifthe difference between the additional or updated context information andthe initial or previous context information is scored above a thresholdvalue, automation engine 302 may generate a new workspace at 210.Session data metadata and context may be preserved by data aggregationengine 336, and session data may be restored as applicable.

Additionally, or alternatively, method 200 may terminate or retire theinitial or previous workspace at 213, as part of termination phase 200C.In some cases, user action may initiate the termination process (e.g.,user 201 closes application or browser accessing data) and/ortermination may take place automatically as part of an adjustment inworkspace definition (e.g., the isolated environment is instructed toterminate by automation engine 302). Still as part of termination phase200C, workspace resources of IHS 100 and/or at workspace orchestrationservice 206 may be released.

As such, in various embodiments, method 200 enables secure userproductivity even when a workspace operates on an IHS or cloud platformthat is not under direct management. Method 200 also provides fordynamic or adaptive configurations and policies allowing for the bestpossible user experience while maintaining appropriate level ofsecurity. In some cases, the definition of a productivity environmentand access requirements may be selected based upon productivity andsecurity dependencies and targets, and the definition of capabilitiesrelated to the workspace may be adaptive in nature. Particularly,workspace definition attributes may be dynamically selected based uponhistorical productivity and security information, based upon eachindividual user or group's behavior.

FIGS. 3A and 3B show a diagram of an example of system components 300Aand 300B (collectively referred to as “system 300”) configured tomodernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in an enterpriseproductivity ecosystem. Particularly, component system 300A comprisesworkspace orchestration service 206, and it may include one or more IHSsremotely located and/or networked having program instructions storedthereon that, upon execution, cause the one or more IHSs to performvarious workspace orchestration operations described herein, including,but not limited to: the dynamic evaluation of security and productivitytargets based upon updated context information received from IHS 100,the calculation of risk scores and other productivity and securitymetrics based on ongoing collection of context information, thegeneration of workspace definitions, and the assembly of one or morefiles or policies that enable the instantiation of a workspace inaccordance with a workspace definition at a cloud service and/or IHS300B.

Component 300B includes IHS 100 may have program instructions storedthereon that, upon execution, cause IHS 100 to perform various localmanagement operations described herein, including, but not limited to,the collection of productivity and security context information, thecalculation of productivity scores and/or risk scores, theinstantiation, execution, and modification of a workspace based uponfiles or policies, such as workspace definitions, received fromworkspace orchestration service 206, etc.

Workspace orchestration service 300A and IHS 300B may be coupled to eachother via any suitable network technology and/or protocol, which allowsworkspace orchestration service 300A to be remotely provided withrespect to IHS 300B. As described with regard to FIG. 1, an IHSaccording to embodiments may include a component such as a trustedcontroller that may support certain secure out-of-band communicationsthat are independent from the OS of IHS 100. In some embodiments, such atrusted controller may be configured to support deployment and operationof workspaces on 300A and to report changes in context information tothe workspace orchestration service 300A.

As illustrated in component 300A of FIG. 3A, workspace orchestrationservice 206 may include a number of sub-components that supportdeployment and ongoing evaluation and adaptation of workspaces on an IHS300B. Embodiments of the workspace orchestration service 300A mayinclude systems that may support: web services 306, manufacturerintegration 317, and analytics 323. Moreover, web services 306 maycomprise application services 301 and user interface (UI) and automationservices 302.

Analytics services 323 may be configured to receive and process contextinformation from IHS 300B, both during initial configuration of aworkspace and in ongoing support of workspaces, and to provide thatinformation, along with any analytics generated, to context logic 303 ofapplication services 301. Based on information collected during thedeployment and ongoing support of workspaces, support assistanceintelligence engine (SATE) 324 may be configured to generate and/oranalyze technical support information (e.g., updates, errors, supportlogs, etc.) for use in diagnosing and repairing workspace issues.Workspace insights and telemetry engine 325 may be configured to analyzeand/or produce device-centric, historical, and behavior-based data(e.g., hardware measurements, use of features, settings, etc.) resultingfrom the operation of workspaces. Workspace intelligence 326 may includeany suitable intelligence engine for processing and evaluating contextdata in order to identify patterns and tendencies in the operation ofworkspaces and in the adaptation of workspaces based on context changes.

As illustrated, an application services 306 system of the workspaceorchestration service 300A includes an UI and automation services 302system that may include context logic or engine 303, classificationpolicy 304, and condition control module or engine 305. Context logic orengine 303 may support processing of context information in making riskassessments (e.g., evaluating the risk associated requests by the useragainst the context of the user's behavior, history of the user's IHS,capabilities of the user's IHS, and environmental conditions). Forinstance, security context information collected by IHS 300B may beprovided to workspace orchestration service 300A where it may be used,such as by context logic 303, to calculate a risk score associated witha request for use of a managed data source and/or application.Classification policy 304 may include administrator and machine-learningdefined policies describing risk classifications associated withdifferent security contexts, such as risk classifications for specificdata, locations, environments, IHSs, logical environments, or useractions (e.g., use of high-risk data requires use of a workspacedefinition suitable for use with a risk score above a specific value).Condition control module or engine 305 may include intelligenceproviding automated decision making for appropriately aligning risk andcontext. In some cases, condition control module or engine 305 maydynamically deploy a solution to address any detected misalignment ofrisk and context. For instance, upon requesting access to a highlyclassified data source that results in a significant increase in riskscore, the condition control engine may select workspace definitionmodifications that implement security procedures that are suitable forthe higher risk score.

Application services 301 may include a group of web services 306 calledon by UI and automation services 302 to support various aspects of theorchestration of workspaces. Particularly, web services 306 may includeapplication and workspace services 307 that may assemble and packageapplications for deployment in a workspace (e.g., an “.msix” filepackaged and deployed to a MICROSOFT HYPER-V container). In someembodiments, a workspace definition may be used to specify whether auser will be provided access to an application in this manner. Webservices 306 may also include a tenant subscription module 308, thatperforms dynamic configuration of an IHS and deployment of the describedworkspace orchestration services at the point-of-sale (POS) of an IHS. Alicense tracking module 309 may be used to maintain and track licenseinformation for software, services, and IHSs. An access control module310 may provide top level access controls used in controlling access todata and applications by authorized users. A Unified Endpoint Management(UEM) module 311 may be configured to support the describedorchestration of workspaces on various different IHSs that may beutilized by a particular user.

Web services 306 that may be used in support of workspaces may furtherinclude resource provisioning services 312 for configuring an IHS orworkspace with secrets/credentials necessary to access specificresources (e.g., credentials for use of VPNs, networks, data storagerepositories, workspace encryption, workspace attestation, andworkspace-to-device anchoring). In some cases, resource provisioningservices 312 may include secrets provisioned as part of a trustedassembly process of IHS 300B and, in some instances, associated with aunique identifier 348 of the IHS 300B. Web services 306 may also includean authorization/token module that provides identity functions and mayconnect to various authentication sources, such as, for example, ActiveDirectory. Endpoint registration module 314 may be configured toregister IHSs and/or workspaces with management service that tracks theuse of the described workspace orchestration. In some scenarios, adirectory services 315 module may be configured to provide activedirectory services (e.g., AZURE ACTIVE DIRECTORY from MICROSOFTCORPORATION). Device configuration services 316 enable centralconfiguration, monitoring, managing, and optimization of workspaces thatin certain contexts may operate remotely from an IHS and may onlypresent the user of the IHS with an image of the workspace output. Incooperation with resource provisioning services 312, deviceconfiguration services 316 may also handle secret creation and IHSconfiguration, and it some cases, may be out-of-band capable and handleselected operations to the endpoint.

Still referring to FIG. 3A, manufacturer integration components 317communicate with application services 301 and client IHS 300B to providefeatures that are usable during workspace evaluation and instantiation,where these features are based upon information available to themanufacturer of client IHS 300B. For instance, certificate authority 318may include an entity that issues digital certificates that may be usedin validating the authenticity and integrity of the hardware of IHS300B. Identity service module or engine 319 may be configured to managethe user's or owner's identity as well as brokering identification foruse of customer directory 322. Order entitlement module or engine 320may be responsible for managing the entitlements purchased as well asthe associated issued certificates signed by 318. Ownership repository321 may manage user entitlements associated with IHSs and theirownership and may provide support for users transferring ownership of anIHS and conveying the entitlements associated with that IHS. In certainscenarios, ownership repository 321 may use this transfer of ownershipto decommission the secrets associated with the entitlements embedded inthe IHS. Customer directory 322 may be configured to authenticate andauthorize all users and IHSs in a network, such as assigning andenforcing security policies for all IHSs and installing or updatingsoftware (in some cases, customer directory 322 may work in cooperationand/or may be the same as directory services 315).

Referring now to IHS 300B of FIG. 3B, in some embodiments, IHS 300B maybe configured to operate a local management agent 332 that may runwithin a secure execution environment 345 hosted by a trusted controller341, such as trusted controller 115 of FIG. 1. In other embodiments, thelocal management agent 332 may operate as a trusted and attestableprocess of the OS of IHS 300B. In some embodiments, local managementagent 332 may include a workspace engine suitable for instantiating andmanaging the operation of one or more workspaces 331A-N on IHS 300B. Asdescribed, the capabilities of a workspace may be modified based onchanges in the productivity and security contexts in which the workspaceis operating. Accordingly, the workload(s) in each of the workspaces331A-N may be hosted in a public cloud, a private cloud, a specificserver, or locally hosted on IHS 300B, depending on the context in whichthe workspace is operating. These allocations of workspace computing foreach particular workspace 331A-N may be prescribed by the workspacedefinition that is used to build and operate each workspace. Asdescribed, the workspace definition may be created by workspaceorchestration service 206 based upon context information provided by IHS300B, security targets for each workspace 331A-N, and productivitytargets for each workspace 331A-N.

In some embodiments, local management agent 332 may be configured tohost, launch, and/or execute a workspace hub 327 that provides a launchpoint 203 by which user's initiate workspaces through the selection ofmanaged data and resources. In various embodiments, launch point 203 maybe an agent, application, special-purpose workspace or web portal theprovides an interface by which a user may select from an aggregatedcollection of data sources, applications, calendars, messages or othermanaged information or resources that are available to the user of IHS300B via operation of a workspace as described herein. In variousembodiments, the launch point 203 may be provided in the form fortextual, graphical and/or audio user interfaces that allow a user of IHS300B to select available data and/or resources. In some embodiments,workspace hub 327 may utilize a local environment management module 328in providing the workspace interface that is presented to the user onIHS 300B and doing so in a consistent manner across workspaces 331A-N.Workspace hub 327 may also include a local intelligence logic or engine329 used to support modeling the use of IHS 300B in order to improvecharacterization of the actual risk associated with a risk context. Userauthentication and access control operations may be performed by a localidentify module 330 that may interface with trusted controller 341 inproviding user authentication.

In some cases, each instantiated workspace 331A-N may be an environmentthat provides a user with access to requested data or applications,where the environment may be isolated in varying degrees from thehardware and software of IHS 300B based on the security context andproductivity context in which each workspace 331A-N is operating. Insome instances, the selection of a data source or resource that areavailable to user via launch point 203 may result in launching a newworkspace. For instance, if a user launches a browser through selectionof an icon displayed by launch point 203, a new workspace may be createdand launched according to a workspace definition that has been selectedfor providing the user access to a web browser in the security andproductivity contexts in which the request has been made. In a scenariowhere the user double clicks on a confidential presentation fileavailable from a data source that is provided by launch point 203, anadditional workspace may be instantiated with a presentation applicationproviding access to the requested presentation file, where this newworkspace is created based on a workspace definition that providedappropriate security for access to the confidential presentation). Inother instances, a selection of the presentation file by a user mayresult in the presentation being made available through the existingworkspace, in some cases using the existing workspace definition and, inother cases, using a workspace definition that has been modified tosupport the requested access to the confidential presentation file.

Although workspaces 331A-N supported by IHS 330B may each be isolated tovarying degrees from the hardware and/or software of IHS 300B and fromeach other, a user of IHS 330B may expect to be able to operate themultiple workspaces 331A-N in a manner that allows content to betransferred between the different workspaces 331A-N. For instance, auser may select a portion of the data displayed in workspace 331A andutilize OS or other workspace functions to copy the data for copying toworkspace 331B.

In various embodiments, a local management agent 332 may operate in fullor in part on a secure platform 345 hosted by trusted controller 341that operates independent from the OS of IHS 300B. In some embodiments,all or part of local management agent 332 may operate as trustedcomponents of the OS of IHS 300B. To execute the various operationsdescribed herein, local management agent 332 may include a commandmonitor 334 configured to provide instrumentation to receive commandsfrom workspace orchestration service 300A and thus enable access to IHS300B. Local management agent 332 may also include telemetry module 335that may be configured for communicating collected information to theworkspace orchestration service 300A, including reporting changes incontext that may warrant adjustments to workspaces 331A-N. Dataaggregator 336 may track all of the data source and other resources(e.g., applications, local or cloud-based services) that may be providedto the user via a workspace.

Local management agent 332 may utilize a resource manager module 337that is configured to manage access to data, network configuration, suchas for VPNs and network access, identity information, access control,and resource provisioning services. Security module 338 may beconfigured to provide various security services. BIOS interface 339 mayprovide a secure BIOS interface used for accessing and managingcredentials in secure object storage. A BIOS analytics module 340 may beconfigured to perform forensic services for BIOS telemetry and healthassessments. Persistence module 346 may be configured to supportpersistence of applications entitled at a POS or assigned byadministrators and supported with required license tracking. Workspaceattestation module 333 may provide a platform centric service layer ontop of a container engine provided by local management agent 332 and maybe used to measure and attest workspaces 331A-N in any suitable mannerdefined or orchestrated by condition control 305.

As part of secure platform 345, native management module 347 may beconfigured to enable out-of-band management interface with workspaceorchestration service 206, where this OOB interface operates independentform the OS of IHS 300B. In some embodiments, the OOB managementinterface supported by native management module 347 may be utilized bythe device configuration services 316 of the workspace orchestrationservice to access the secure platform services 345 of IHS 300B.

Digital device ID module 348 may provide a unique, unspoofable,cryptographically bound identifier. In embodiments supporting a secureplatform 345, secure embedded controller 341 may be a hardened hardwaremodule that may include a root of trust module 342 configured as atrusted data store and, in some cases for cryptographic processing, thatmay be trusted within a cryptographic system. A device attestationservice 343 may be configured to perform device assurance and trustservices (e.g., secure BIOS and secure boot, etc.). A secure objectstore 344 may be provided that is configured to lock and access keys,hashes, and/or other secrets in an EC and/or trusted platform module(TPM).

In some scenarios, IHS 100 may be provisioned by a manufacturer thatalso controls manufacturer integration components 317, workspaceattestation module 333 may operate in conjunction with secure objectstore 342, authenticated BIOS module 339, and/or digital device identitymodule 348, etc., to further secure and/or control productivity featuresavailable in any of workspaces 331A-N based upon hardware devices andsettings unique to that IHS and/or designed specifically by thatmanufacturer.

To further illustrate how the systems and methods described hereinoperate to modernize workspace and hardware lifecycle management in anenterprise productivity ecosystem, three non-limiting use-cases orexamples are discussed in turn below.

Use-Case A

In use-case A, a given user may request access to a protected datasource on the enterprise's premise using a corporate-owned and imagednotebook, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3B.

In response to the request, a local management agent 332 operating onthe user's notebook retrieves information describing the current contextand calculates security and productivity targets based on the determinedcontext. In this use-case, the local management agent may have beeninstalled by IT, and it may be running in the background as a service.The confidential data may be associated with the local management agenton the local machine, based on file classification (e.g., filemetadata/type/properties/permissions, folder location, encrypted region,etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuously collectcurrent context information and send it to the orchestration service foruse in scoring the risk and productivity of the workspace (this may alsobe done at the time of the user's access request or indication ofintent).

When the user selects the confidential data, such as via a selection viathe OS of the notebook, the local management agent notifies theworkspace orchestration service of the request and for a workspacedefinition for a workspace by which the user may be provided access tothe confidential data.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “2,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 1 (safe locale); userpersona: 1 (known high-confidence in a reasonably sophisticated userclassification—a user whom historically does not click on phishingemails); network risk: 1 (low risk because of on premise, wiredconnection detected); device risk: 1 (high level of control because ofcorporate owned/managed platform, known versions, security featuresenabled, etc.); regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., No restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.); and data type: 8 (a confidential datafile is beingrequested).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 10 (office); user persona: 9 (a“skilled” classification based upon advanced compute tasks, proficiency,and/or speed); network speed/latency: 10 (fast, wired, Gigabit Ethernet,or direct to internal network); device performance: 8 (fast, expensiveCPU, memory, graphics, but storage only needs—e.g., <10 GB); and datatype: 10 (the local, confidential file is easy to read/write with lowlatency and high performance on local storage).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, the security target may be deemed to have a value of“1” based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads,needs, or demands on security controls and containment features that mayinclude: threat monitoring: 1 (low demand); threat detection: 1 (lowdemand); threat analytics: 1 (low demand); threat response: 1 (lowdemand); storage confidentiality: 2 (low); storage integrity: 2 (low);network confidentiality: 1 (low); network integrity: 1 (low); memoryconfidentiality: 1 (low); memory integrity: 1 (low); displayconfidentiality: 1 (low); display integrity: 1 (low); userauthentication: 1 (low, basic password is fine, non-multifactorauthentication or “MFA,” no session expiration); IT administrator scope:1 (administrator manages remotely but does not need heavy remediationsoftware; and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, no PCI, notech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “9” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 10 (can useapplications, install applications that the user needs, give themadministrator rights, etc.).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 1 (local managementagent does not install threat, detection, and response or “TDR”software); threat detection: 1 (local management agent does not installTDR software); threat analytics: 1 (orchestration does not need togather detailed telemetry from the system, OS will not be enrolled inlogging); threat response: 1 (local management agent does not installsecurity threat response agent); storage confidentiality: 2 (localmanagement agent deploys a local file-system encryption product that theuser can optionally enable on specific files as needed with right-clickcontext menus); storage integrity: 2; network confidentiality: 1 (localmanagement agent confirms basic firewall configuration is correct—e.g.,IT GPO-controlled); network integrity: 1; memory confidentiality: 1(local management agent confirms configuration—e.g., No SGX, TXT, orcontainer/sandbox software deployed); memory integrity: 1; displayconfidentiality: 1 (local management agent confirms graphics driversinstalled, privacy screen and camera optionally managed by user);display integrity: 1; user authentication: 1 (local agent confirms basicGPO password rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc.); IT administrator scope: 1(local agent runs with system privilege, confirms IT admin accounts arelisted in local admin user group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatorycompliance: 1 (local agent does not install any compliance assistancesoftware).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case B

In use-case B, a user may request access to a confidential datafilewhile at a coffee shop using an open public network and anIT-managed/owned PC, such configured as described with regard to IHS 100of FIG. 1 and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3B.

First, a local management agent (332) executed by a client IHS (300B)retrieves the requested context and calculates security and productivityscores based on context. In this use-case, the local management agentmay have been installed by IT, and it may be running in the backgroundas a service. The confidential data may kept on a shared IT-managednetwork resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporate office),and the local management agent may be responsible for monitoring whenthis data path is requested by the user (e.g., the user hits a specificURL, IP, etc.). Moreover, the local management agent may continuouslycollect all current context and send it to the workspace orchestrationservice to assist in scoring processes later (this may also be done atthe time of the user's access request or indication of intent, ratherthan a continuous collection).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile, the client IHS(300B)'s OS calls the local management agent associated with the path tothe confidential datafile and calls back to a remote workspaceorchestration service (206) to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “4,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also given as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 5 (public, safe country);user persona: 5 (new user, classification data does not exist yet);network risk: 5 (medium, public but common location, wireless connectiondetected); device risk: 1 (high level of control, corporateowned/managed platform, known versions, security features enabled,etc.); and regulatory: 1 (based on user, data, locationcombinations—e.g., no restrictions with respect to General DataProtection Regulation or “GDPR,” Health Insurance Portability andAccountability Act “HIPAA,” Payment Card Industry “PCI,” technologyexport, etc.).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon context information orinputs, each of which is also given as a resource metric based upon aselected policy. For instance, security contexts inputs may include:locale: 6 (remote location but in USA major city, in a public area,non-employees are within visual/audio range of device); user persona: 5(unknown confidence “null” classification, uses default onboardingassumptions); network speed/latency: 4 (medium, wireless but AC onshared network); and device performance: 8 (fast, expensive CPU, memory,graphics, but storage only needs ˜<10 GB).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “4”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 4 (medium demand); threat detection: 4 (mediumdemand); threat analytics: 4 (medium demand); threat response: 4 (mediumdemand); storage confidentiality: 4 (medium); storage integrity: 9(high); network confidentiality: 5 (medium); network integrity: 2 (low);memory confidentiality: 4 (medium); memory integrity: 8 (high); displayconfidentiality: 7 (medium/high—worried about “shoulder surfers” readingdata from an adjacent seat or table nearby, public location) displayintegrity: 2 (low); user authentication: 4 (medium, two-factorauthentication using a hardware token, session expiration upon sleep,screen lock, or logout); IT administration scope: 3 (administrator canmonitor, manage, and remediate remotely if the user calls them for helpwith IT issues); and regulatory compliance: 1 (no GDPR, No HIPAA, noPCI, no tech export restriction, etc.).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “7” (defining a high-quality, responsive user experience) basedupon a combination of attribute values representing productivityrequirements as follows: local storage: 7 (partial hard drive control,some storage reserved for IT load); CPU access: 10 (unlimited); localgraphics: 10 (unlimited); and application stack: 7 (can useapplications, can install some IT-approved applications that the userneeds, but no administrator rights, because the user cannot be trustedto install only valid/safe productivity software, but can installpre-approved IT applications as needed).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and the local management agent may assemble theworkspace and instantiate it for the user. For example, the localmanagement agent may receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.)from the orchestration service, and it may parse the file to implementsecurity risk controls such as: threat monitoring: 5 (local managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat detection: 5 (local management agent installs orconfirms prior installation/configuration of TDR software); threatanalytics: 5 (orchestration confirms telemetry is accessible, OS will beenrolled in logging if not already enrolled); threat response: 2 (localmanagement agent downloads but does not run remote incident responseapplication—preparation in case incident is detected); storageconfidentiality: 5 (local management agent deploys a local containertechnology, such as sandbox, with restricted “save” permissions suchthat the confidential files will not be allowed to save locally on thePC, but can be accessed as long as the session is active in memory);storage integrity: 5; network confidentiality: 5 (local management agentsteps up firewall protections, disabling all unnecessary ports, andestablishes a VPN back to the corporate office for protecting traffic tothe local sandbox); network integrity: 5; memory confidentiality: 5(local management agent configures sandbox container to isolateapplication and data from other applications/threats that may infiltratethe host OS); memory integrity: 5; display confidentiality: 7 (localmanagement agent confirms graphics drivers installed, enforces privacyscreen and uses camera to detect specific onlooker threats); displayintegrity: 7; user authentication: 4 (local agent confirms basic GPOpassword rules are configured, and met by user—e.g., number ofcharacters, no session expiration, etc., but also adds in a requirementfor hardware token to log in and again to establish network); ITadministrator scope: 4 (local agent runs with administrator and remoteaccess privilege, confirms IT admin accounts are listed in local adminuser group—e.g., per GPO); and regulatory compliance: 4 (local agentinstalls state specific rule enforcement or monitoring software).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedlocal confidential file, and the user may begin working in a newlycreated workspace.

Use-Case C

In use-case C, a user may request access to a confidential datafile in aweb hosted remote portal using a browser from Kazakhstan, while at aninternet café with a borrowed/rented PC, such configured as describedwith regard to IHS 100 of FIG. 1 and client IHS 300B of FIG. 3B, on anopen WiFi network.

First, a remote workspace orchestration service (332) intercepts theaccess request and evaluates the browser and user context, andcalculates security and productivity scores. In this use-case, there isno local management agent; all that is known is the browser and anytelemetry returned or garnered through the HTTP/S session. Assume, forsake of this example, that the confidential data may kept on a sharedIT-managed network resource on-premises (e.g., back in a main corporateoffice) and that the datafile will remain there with only remoterendering/access privileges. Web-based context may be gathered throughthe browser session or supplied by the user. Moreover, user context mayalso be collected for the workspace orchestration service throughalternate side-channels (e.g., travel calendar information, recent userbilling activity on corporate credit card, phone call logs, and/orlocation data).

When the user selects the desired confidential datafile from the webbrowser, the back-end web server infrastructure calls back to theworkspace orchestration service to request a workspace definition.

In this example, the workspace orchestration service may score anoverall security risk to have a value of “9,” using a weighed, machinelearning, or artificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the followingcontext information or inputs, each of which is also scored as a riskmetric based upon a selected policy: locale: 9 (Kazakhstan); userpersona: 1 (user was expected to be there, the timing seems right basedupon past logins, and he has a biometric watch communicator proving heis alive, himself, and located where he says he is—so that IT can alwaystrust him); network risk: 9 (high, public and in a very obscure place);device risk: 9 (zero trust); and regulatory: 8 (based on user, data,location combinations).

The workspace orchestration service may also calculate a productivityscore to have a value of “5,” using a weighed, machine learning, orartificial intelligence algorithm, based upon the following contextinformation or inputs, each of which is also given as a resource metricbased upon a selected policy: locale: 3 (internet café device withoutgreat performance); user persona: 9 (known high-confidence and “skilled”classification—advanced compute tasks, proficiency, and speed); networkspeed/latency: 3 (low quality—Wireless G from a long way away); anddevice performance: 3 (have to be able to tolerably browse web pages butbased on what the service believes the capabilities will be, the serviceshould build simple ones).

Second, based upon the security score and/or context information, theworkspace orchestration service builds a workspace definition filehaving any suitable structure with workspace definition attributes in amachine-readable format (e.g., JSON name-value, XML structured, etc.).In this example, a security target may be deemed to have a value of “9”based upon a combination of attributes values representing loads, needs,or demands on security controls and containment features as follows:threat monitoring: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat detection: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat analytics: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);threat response: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);storage confidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the serverside); storage integrity: 8; network confidentiality: 10 (high demand,to be handled on the server side); network integrity: 9; memoryconfidentiality: 10 (high demand, to be handled on the server side);memory integrity: 9; display confidentiality: 10 (high, “shouldersurfers” may read datafile from an adjacent seat or table nearby in apublic location); display integrity: 9; user authentication: 10 (high,three-factor authentication using login, hardware token, and biometricsatellite watch—session expiration and refreshes every 30 seconds); ITadministrator scope: 8 (administrator may monitor, manage, and remediateremotely if the user calls them for help or anything unexpectedhappens); and regulatory compliance: 10 (all network traffic is securelymonitored as will the data presented).

Based upon the productivity target and/or context information, aproductivity target for the workspace definition may be deemed to have avalue of “3” (defining a usable secure user experience primarily builtfor consumption and not productivity) based upon a combination ofattribute values representing productivity requirements as follows:local storage: 1 (cache only); CPU access: 3 (build for limitedexpectations); local graphics: 3 (build for limited expectations); andapplication stack: 1 (web browser experience on a kiosk mode device,limited data entry capability, limited read access to need-to-know onlyinformation through VDI rendered kiosk).

Third, after the workspace definition is complete, the workspaceorchestration service and remote cloud web portal (e.g., session theuser logged into through the browser) may assemble the workspace andinstantiate it for the user in the browser. For example, the web portalmay receive definition files (e.g., JSON, XML, etc.) from theorchestration service, and it may parse the file to implement securityrisk controls such as: threat monitoring: 9 (data center basedmanagement agent installs or confirms prior installation/configurationof TDR software); threat detection: 9 (data center based managementagent installs or confirms prior installation/configuration of TDRsoftware); threat analytics: 9 (orchestration confirms telemetry isaccessible, server hosting web server may be enrolled in logging if notalready enrolled—user behavioral telemetry from side channels may alsobe continuously monitored for suspicious/anomalous activity); threatresponse: 10 (data center-based management agent sets up watchdog timerto kill session automatically without periodic check-ins fromorchestration, user telemetry, and web browser); storageconfidentiality: 9 (data center-based management agent builds aprogressive web application that may be used to display the data througha secure TLS link—the data will be rendered but only the as-neededportions of visualization presented to the user, and nothing can besaved); storage integrity: 10; network confidentiality: 9 (route trafficthrough best effort to secure locations—do not allow anything exceptbitmap renderings through the enforceable network); network integrity:4; memory confidentiality: 9 (web page viewer only-no data leaves thedata center, no confidential input is taken from the rented PC, nokeyboard input is allowed, and all input may be captured from randomizedvirtual keyboard using mouse click coordinates); memory integrity: 8;display confidentiality: 8 (best effort to ensure confidentiality—promptuser at least—adjustable font sizes, but defaults to small fonts,obfuscated text, etc.); display integrity: 2; user authentication: 9(local agent confirms basic password rules are configured, and met byuser—e.g., number of characters, no session expiration, etc., but alsoadds in a requirement for hardware token and biometric, satellite watchto log in and again to establish network, requiring frequentreconfirmation from user); IT administrator scope: 7 (data center-basedremote environment); and regulatory compliance: 8 (local agent does notexist but data center-based agent monitors/blocks data not appropriate).

After confirming the configuration, the workspace orchestration serviceand the local management agent may give the user access to the requestedrendered data, and the user may begin working in a newly createdworkspace.

The process of registering a new IHS for management by workspaceorchestration service 206, or other remote service(s), can be difficultfor certain users. The registration procedure can add security risks andproductivity losses if not performed correctly. In some cases, the newor unknown IHS may be completely untrusted. Moreover, the network thatthe IHS has initial connectivity to may also be untrusted or unknown.

For at least these reasons, establishing initial trust on an IHS wouldgreatly enhance the security context of the IHS and the user associationof that IHS. This additional security would also facilitateprovisioning, safeguarding user credentials, and running a workspacewith increased or optimized productivity.

It is important for IHS manufacturers, however, not to have to directlyassociate device identification information (e.g., IHS service tag) witha customer at the factory (or in a merge center secondary process)because creating the association adds shipping delays, costs, and/orcomplexity of operations. Some IHS manufactures sell IHSs to be directshipped to end-users while those IHSs are on a boat in the ocean.Furthermore, end-users need the same flexibility when they purchase or areplace an IHS through a retail outlet (as opposed to from the IHSmanufacturer), and a registration entity may not be under control of theIHS manufacturer.

To address these, and other issues, systems and methods described hereinmay be used to deploy workspaces using a secondary trusted device. Invarious embodiments, an end-user may already have at least one device orIHS (e.g., a smart phone, tablet, a smart watch, a kiosk-type device, acountertop device etc.) under management that is trusted by workspaceorchestration service 206 within the corporate enterprise domain. Theseembodiments may leverage an IHS manufacturer's registered device ID(e.g., a service tag, etc.) and associated entitlements to perform asecure device entitlement procedure, such that a confirmation and/orencryption channel created through the secondary trusted device enablesthe secure provisioning of an untrusted device in an untrustedenvironment. After a successfully registration, other services may alsobe securely provided.

FIG. 4 is a diagram depicting an example of method 400 for workspacedeployment using secondary trusted device 407. In various embodiments,method 400 may be performed by IHS 100 executing local management agent332 in cooperation with a secondary IHS (e.g., a phone) 407 andworkspace orchestration service 206. At 401, user 201 starts withmanaged device 407 under control by workspace orchestration service 206such that workspace orchestration service 206 and is already in constantor periodic communications with managed device 407. As a result, at 401secondary IHS 407 is deemed trusted and/or managed by workspaceorchestration service 206.

At 402, IHS 100 has its device identification information (e.g., aservice tag or device ID) registered with or created by manufacturerportal or service 408 and stored in a database, such as, for example, asoftware entitlement database that contains information associating eachmanufactured IHS with a corresponding right to use, access, and/orconsume at least one application or resource. Still at 402, manufacturerportal or service 406 may create an encryption key pair associated withthe device ID for IHS 100, and it may store at least a portion of thatinformation in the database.

At 403, IHS 100 may establish a first connection with secondary trusteddevice 407 executing, for example a management and/or orchestrationagent. At 404, secondary trusted IHS 407 receives an orchestration codeor nonce from workspace orchestration service 206 via a secondconnection, and it transmits the orchestration code to IHS 100 via thefirst connection. In return, IHS 100 transmits its device ID and theorchestration code encrypted with a private key of the encryption keypair to secondary trusted IHS 407 via the first connection, andsecondary trusted IHS 407 transmits the encrypted information toworkspace orchestration service 206 via the second connection.

At 405, workspace orchestration service 206 queries manufacturer service408 and/or 317, and it receives a public key of the encryption key pairassociated with the device ID of IHS 100. Then at 406, workspaceorchestration service 206 decrypts the orchestration code and verifiesthe device ID of IHS 100. In response to a successful authentication,workspace orchestration service 206 instructs secondary trusted device407 to provide Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer(SSL) connection data and/or registration information to IHS 100. IHS100 in turn uses the TLS or SSL data to establish a secure thirdconnection directly with workspace orchestration service 206, thusbypassing secondary trusted device 100.

Still at 406, IHS 100 may receive a workspace definition from workspaceorchestration service 206 via the third connection, and it mayinstantiate a workspace based on that workspace definition. In somecases, the security target based upon which the workspace definition iscreated may be calculated, at least in part, based upon theparticipation of the second IHS in the authentication of IHS 100 (e.g.,such that a resulting workspace definition allows a larger attacksurface when the second IHS is involved).

As such, using systems and methods described herein, a new IHS may gounder management by the same entity that manages the trusted devicewithout prior registration. This simplifies the user and IT experienceof what can otherwise be a confusing registration process for end-users.It also removes steps of management entity and domain assignment. Thesesystems and method may also provide class attestation (e.g., “I amregistered with a trusted entity”), rather than a specific deviceattestation of an IHS assigned to a customer, domain, or tenant. Inother implementations, other techniques for validating the trust contextof the secondary trusted IHS may be used. For example, a trust chain mayalternatively or additionally be secured by validating it against aspecific carrier sequence or the like.

It should be understood that various operations described herein may beimplemented in software executed by processing circuitry, hardware, or acombination thereof. The order in which each operation of a given methodis performed may be changed, and various operations may be added,reordered, combined, omitted, modified, etc. It is intended that theinvention(s) described herein embrace all such modifications and changesand, accordingly, the above description should be regarded in anillustrative rather than a restrictive sense.

The terms “tangible” and “non-transitory,” as used herein, are intendedto describe a computer-readable storage medium (or “memory”) excludingpropagating electromagnetic signals; but are not intended to otherwiselimit the type of physical computer-readable storage device that isencompassed by the phrase computer-readable medium or memory. Forinstance, the terms “non-transitory computer readable medium” or“tangible memory” are intended to encompass types of storage devicesthat do not necessarily store information permanently, including, forexample, RAM. Program instructions and data stored on a tangiblecomputer-accessible storage medium in non-transitory form may afterwardsbe transmitted by transmission media or signals such as electrical,electromagnetic, or digital signals, which may be conveyed via acommunication medium such as a network and/or a wireless link.

Although the invention(s) is/are described herein with reference tospecific embodiments, various modifications and changes can be madewithout departing from the scope of the present invention(s), as setforth in the claims below. Accordingly, the specification and figuresare to be regarded in an illustrative rather than a restrictive sense,and all such modifications are intended to be included within the scopeof the present invention(s). Any benefits, advantages, or solutions toproblems that are described herein with regard to specific embodimentsare not intended to be construed as a critical, required, or essentialfeature or element of any or all the claims.

Unless stated otherwise, terms such as “first” and “second” are used toarbitrarily distinguish between the elements such terms describe. Thus,these terms are not necessarily intended to indicate temporal or otherprioritization of such elements. The terms “coupled” or “operablycoupled” are defined as connected, although not necessarily directly,and not necessarily mechanically. The terms “a” and “an” are defined asone or more unless stated otherwise. The terms “comprise” (and any formof comprise, such as “comprises” and “comprising”), “have” (and any formof have, such as “has” and “having”), “include” (and any form ofinclude, such as “includes” and “including”) and “contain” (and any formof contain, such as “contains” and “containing”) are open-ended linkingverbs. As a result, a system, device, or apparatus that “comprises,”“has,” “includes” or “contains” one or more elements possesses those oneor more elements but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreelements. Similarly, a method or process that “comprises,” “has,”“includes” or “contains” one or more operations possesses those one ormore operations but is not limited to possessing only those one or moreoperations.

1. A first Information Handling System (IHS), comprising: a processor;and a memory coupled to the processor, the memory having programinstructions stored thereon that, upon execution, cause the first IHSto: establish a first connection with a second IHS, wherein the secondIHS is configured to establish a second connection with a workspaceorchestration service, and wherein the workspace orchestration serviceis configured to: receive device identification information of the firstIHS from the second IHS; and authenticate the device identificationinformation against a database provided by a manufacturer of the firstIHS; and in response to a successful authentication, establish a thirdconnection with the workspace orchestration service.
 2. The first IHS ofclaim 1, wherein the second IHS is managed by the workspaceorchestration service prior to the first connection.
 3. The first IHS ofclaim 1, wherein the program instructions upon execution, further causethe first IHS to: receive an orchestration code from the second IHS,wherein the second IHS is configured to receive the orchestration codefrom the workspace orchestration service and to transmit theorchestration code to the first IHS; and transmit the deviceidentification information and the orchestration code encrypted with afirst key to the second IHS, wherein the second IHS is configured toforward the encrypted device identification information andorchestration code to the workspace orchestration service, and whereinthe workspace orchestration service is configured to retrieve a secondkey corresponding to the first key and decrypt the encrypted deviceidentification information and orchestration code using the second key.4. The first IHS of claim 1, wherein the program instructions, uponexecution, further cause the first IHS to: receive Transport LayerSecurity (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) data from the second IHS,wherein the second IHS is configured to receive the TLS or SSL data fromthe workspace orchestration service and to transmit the TLS or SSL datato the first IHS; and establish the third connection using the TLS orSSL data.
 5. The first IHS of claim 1, wherein the database comprises asoftware entitlement database.
 6. The first IHS of claim 1, wherein theprogram instructions upon execution, further cause the first IHS toreceive a workspace definition from the workspace orchestration servicevia the third connection.
 7. The first IHS of claim 6, wherein theprogram instructions upon execution, further cause the first IHS totransmit context information to the workspace orchestration service, andwherein the workspace orchestration service is configured to: (i)calculate a security target and a productivity target based upon thecontext information, and (ii) create the workspace definition based uponthe security target and the productivity target.
 8. The first IHS ofclaim 7, wherein the security target is calculated, at least in part,based upon the participation of the second IHS in the authentication ofthe first IHS.
 9. The first IHS of claim 7, wherein the security targetis calculated, at least in part, based upon at least one of: a riskmetric associated with a locale of the first IHS, a risk metricassociated with a user of the first IHS, a risk metric associated with anetwork of the client IHS, a risk metric associated with hardware of thefirst IHS, a risk metric associated with a requested datafile, or aregulatory risk metric associated with the user, the locale, and therequested datafile, and wherein the productivity target is calculated bythe workspace orchestration service based upon at least one of: aresource metric associated with a locale of the first IHS, a resourcemetric associated with a user of the first IHS, a resource metricassociated with a network of the first IHS, a resource metric associatedwith hardware of the first IHS, or a resource metric associated with astorage system of a requested datafile.
 10. The first IHS of claim 6,wherein the workspace definition comprises at least one of: a threatmonitoring level, a threat detection level, a threat analytics level, athreat response level, a storage confidentiality level, a networkconfidentiality level, a memory confidentiality level, a displayconfidentiality level, a user authentication level, an InformationTechnology (IT) administration level, a regulatory compliance level, alocal storage control level, a Central Processing Unit (CPU) accesslevel, a graphics access level, an application usage level, or anapplication installation level.
 11. The first IHS of claim 6, whereinthe program instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS toinstantiate a workspace based upon the workspace definition.
 12. Amemory storage device having program instructions stored thereon that,upon execution by an Information Handling System (IHS) of a workspaceorchestration service, cause the IHS to: establish a first connectionwith a first IHS; receive device identification information of a secondIHS from the first IHS, wherein the first IHS is configured to retrievethe device identification information from the second IHS over a secondconnection; authenticate the device identification information against adatabase provided by a manufacturer of the second IHS; and in responseto a successful authentication, establish a third connection with thesecond IHS.
 13. The memory storage device of claim 12, wherein theprogram instructions, upon execution further cause the IHS to establisha trust relationship with the second IHS prior to the first connection.14. The memory storage device of claim 12, wherein the programinstructions upon execution, further cause the IHS to: transmit anorchestration code to the first IHS, wherein the first IHS is configuredto transmit the orchestration code to the second IHS; and receive deviceidentification information and the orchestration code encrypted with afirst key from the first IHS, wherein the first IHS is configured toforward the encrypted device identification information andorchestration code to the workspace orchestration service; retrieve asecond key corresponding to the first key; and decrypt the encrypteddevice identification information and orchestration code using thesecond key.
 15. The memory storage device of claim 12, wherein theprogram instructions, upon execution, further cause the IHS to: transmitTransport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) data to thefirst IHS, wherein the first IHS is configured to transmit the TLS orSSL data to the second IHS; and establish the third connection using theTLS or SSL data.
 16. The memory storage device of claim 12, wherein thedatabase comprises a software entitlement database.
 17. The memorystorage device of claim 12, wherein the program instructions uponexecution, further cause the IHS to transmit a workspace definition tothe second IHS via the third connection, and wherein the second IHS isconfigured to instantiate a workspace based upon the workspacedefinition.
 18. The memory storage device of claim 17, wherein theprogram instructions upon execution, further cause the IHS to: receivecontext information from the second IHS; calculate a security target anda productivity target based upon the context information; and create theworkspace definition based upon the security target and the productivitytarget.
 19. The memory storage device of claim 18, wherein the securitytarget is calculated, at least in part, based upon the participation ofthe first IHS in the authentication of the second IHS.
 20. A method,comprising: establishing, by a first Information Handling System (IHS),a first connection with a second IHS; transmitting, by the first IHS,device identification information received from the second IHS to aworkspace orchestration service over a second connection; in response toa successful authentication of the device identification information bythe workspace orchestration service against a database provided by amanufacturer of the second IHS, receive Transport Layer Security (TLS)or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) from the workspace orchestration service;and transmit, by the first IHS, the TLS or SSL data to the second IHS,wherein the second IHS is configured to establish a third connectionwith the workspace orchestration service using the TLS or SSL data, andwherein the workspace orchestration service is configured to transmit aworkspace definition to the second IHS over the third connection.